Contradictions of naturalism

Mary Midgley

Several times I have pointed out some of the contradictions stated by naturalist philosophy and its different variants: materialism, reductionism, physicalism, scientism, etc. In the previous post I pointed out that Raymond Tallis has detected two important contradictions that he calls darwinitis and neuromania. In this post I am going to bring together a few more, because when one sees them together their power is multiplied. Here are those I have selected:

• Science is the only valid source of human knowledge: Which science has reached this conclusion? Physics? Biology? None of the sciences. Therefore, if what this statement says is true, this statement must be false. We arrive at a contradiction. On the other hand, if this statement is false, there is no problem. Ergo, this statement is false. Therefore, scientism (and thus naturalism) is false.

Naturalism or naturalisms

La cosmovisión naturalista (The Naturalist Worldview) is a monumental book, written in Spanish by Moisés Pérez Marcos, about naturalist philosophies. As with the multiverse, of which there are many different theories, usually incompatible with each other, there are (almost) as many naturalistic philosophies as there are naturalistic philosophers. In other words, they don’t agree among themselves.

The first thing to do when confronted with naturalism is to try to define it and differentiate it from related worldviews:

The brain and consciousness

Canadian psychologist Barry Beyerstein published an article with the same title as this post, and an additional subheading that indicates that he is opposing extrasensory perception (ESP), telekinesis (TK) and other supposedly paranormal phenomena. However, he takes the opportunity to attack the existence of the human soul and the existence of God (although he never names God), and launchs a confession of faith in the identity of mind and brain (Psychoneural Identity, PNI); i.e., the monist theory, although he does not say whether he prefers the reductionist or the emergentist version of monism. In support of this, he offers the following arguments:

Theories about self-consciousness

Svetlana before the mirror
Painting by Karl Briuliov

As I have said in other posts in this blog, the question of self-consciousness is more philosophical than scientific. In this regard, two great philosophical theories have coexisted since time immemorial:

·         Monism: Everything we can perceive, including consciousness, can be explained in terms of a single component: matter, in the broadest sense of the term, which also includes energy. In turn, monism can be classified into two different theories:

o   Reductionist Monism: It asserts that the entire functioning of the universe has a bottom-up explanation. In other words, if we knew enough about elementary particles and their properties, we could explain everything, including self-consciousness.

o   Emergentist Monism: It asserts that the lower level does not explain everything that happens at the higher level, since there are properties (including self-awareness) that only have a top-down explanation. That is to say, complex systems can have a behavior unpredictable in the bottom-up direction.

Physics and Free Will

In the January 2021 issue of Physics World appeared an article entitled Why free will is beyond physics. This article, written by British science writer Philip Ball, is clearly anti-reductionist and says things like these:

“Free will” is not ruled out by physics – because it doesn’t stem from physics in the first place.

If physics can disprove free will, then it must override everything else too, even evolution.

But is free will really undermined by the determinism of physical law? I think such arguments are not even wrong; they are simply misconceived. They don’t recognize how cause and effect work, and by attempting to claim too much jurisdiction for fundamental physics they are not really scientific but metaphysical.

A Singular Universe

Javier Sánchez Cañizares is one of the contributors to the book Preguntas sobre Ciencia y Fe, published in 2014 and republished this year. In 2020, Javier has published a book in Spanish with the same title as this post, which can be considered as a book on philosophy of science at a high level of popularization. The goal of the book is to show that materialistic reductionism has no chance of providing a correct complete explanation, as our universe is singular because of several different reasons:

Mind and Cosmos

Thomas Nagel

Thomas Nagel, philosopher, professor at New York University and specialized in the philosophy of mind, has published a book (Mind and Cosmos) where he summarizes his argumentation against materialist reductionism, dominant in philosophy since the mid-nineteenth century. I have read the book in a Spanish translation made by the Seville professor Francisco Rodríguez Valls, with whom I have collaborated more than once.

The book provides strong arguments in support of the claim that materialistic reductionism cannot explain conscience, reason, and other mental elements without explaining them away. But since conscience and reason are the dominant elements of our worldview, the conclusion we should arrive at is that materialistic reductionism must be false.

Synthetic life, is it possible?

Frankenstein's monster

In the previous two posts in this series we have seen that the generation of synthetic life in the laboratory is probably a process more difficult than some optimists imagine.

Let’s look at one of the latest experiments in synthetic biology: George Church and Nili Ostrov, Harvard biologists, are trying to build a strain of the bacterium Escherichia coli immune to all existing viruses. How? By changing its genetic code so that viruses do not understand it and cannot use the bacterial cellular machinery to reproduce. Since the genetic code is redundant, it is possible to replace one of the codons encoding the amino acid arginine (AGA) with another that also encodes the same amino acid (CGC), and all the genes of the bacterium would go on generating the same proteins. This would be done with several rare codons. But since viruses would continue to use the substituted codons, the bacterial cell machinery would no longer be able to understand the DNA of the virus. This part of the job is almost finished. When it is done, it would also be necessary to eliminate the transfer RNAs of the missing codons and ensure that they are not remanufactured, so that the cellular machinery can no longer use them.

Note that the work done so far is the manipulation of the data recorded in the DNA. It is equivalent to changing the information contained in the hard disk of a computer so that it stops using a certain instruction of the language of the machine, by replacing it with another equivalent instruction. We are still very far from synthetic biology in the strict sense. Will it be possible to synthesize life in the near future?