Atheists use the multiverse theories to escape the need to accept God’s
existence as the cause of a universe which seems to have been designed to make
life possible (fine tuning). While they do this, they are contradicting one of
their most beloved arguments against God’s existence, which they have been using
since the nineteenth century. This one:
The theist hypothesis offers an explanation for
the origin of the world based on two entities: God and the universe.
The atheist hypothesis only needs a single
entity: the universe.
Ergo Occam’s razor favors the atheistic
explanation.
As it is
well known, the lex parsimoniae,
also called Occam’s razor,
one of the fundaments of the scientific method, asserts that, between two competitive theories, we
must prefer that one with the fewest entities (or assumptions).
But the
current situation is quite the opposite. The alternative to the theist
hypothesis is no longer a single entity, the universe, but rather many (between
10500 and an infinity of universes). The previous argument must
therefore be re-written thus:
The theist hypothesis offers an explanation for
the origin of the world based on two entities: God and the universe.
The atheist hypothesis needs to postulate the
existence of 10500 to an infinity of entities: all the universes in
the multverse.
Ergo Occam’s razor favors the theistic
explanation.
This is
appreciated by the atheists themselves. What is their answer? (M.Rees, Just six numbers: the deep forces
that shape the universe, pg. 156):
I’m inclined to go easy with Okham’s razor.
In other
words: if Occam’s razor helps
us, then we use it; if not, we can always say that Occam’s razor should not be
applied to the universe. Otherwise, heads, I win; tails, you lose. Is this
fair play? As the philosopher Antony Flew would say, we must
follow the arguments wherever they lead us.
Furthermore,
the multiverse and God are not incompatible. If God exists and has created a universe,
nothing could prevent Him to create two, ten, or 10500 universes. If we were to find scientific
proofs of the existence of the multiverse (we haven’t them now, and I don’t
believe we’ll have them soon, if ever), that would not prove that God does not
exist.
On the
other hand, if the multiverse exists, the most important question of all would
still be pending:
Why is there something rather than
nothing?
Furthermore,
the multiverse theories cannot solve the fine tuning problem. Of the six
theories mentioned in my previous post, the first five are based on quantum
theory. But then, among all possible multiverses, those based on quantum theory
are a minority. On the other hand, it seems to be a fact that quantum theory is
a pre-requisite for the existence of life. In a classical Newtonian universe,
for instance, life would not be possible, for stars could not exist. We end up,
therefore, again in the starting point: these multiverses, assuming one of them
exists, appear to have been designed to make life possible. With them, the fine tuning problem does not
disappear, it just moves from the universe to the multiverse.
As regards the
sixth multiverse theory (Tegmark’s), it fails on the opposite side: it is too large. In the first five multiverses experimenting
with other universes theories is clearly
impossible. Well, it isn’t so with the mathematical multiverse, the most
general of all. A cellular
automaton (for instance) is a coherent mathematical structure. Therefore,
according to Tegmark, it should also be a universe existing somewhere. So, when
we experiment with cellular automata, we are experimenting with other
universes.
An image from the Game of Life, a cellular automaton by John Horton Conway |
Francisco
José Soler Gil and myself have
proved that the complexity of computationally complete cellular automata
(the most complex in existence) is maintained even though a few of their parameters
are not constant. If we make a parallel with our universe, our existence could
still be possible even though our fundamental constants were not exactly
constant.
Tegmark
himself asserted that our universe, if it is a part of the mathematical multiverse,
should be typical. Well, it appears that it is not. Possible universes
with variable fundamental parameters would be many more than those with these
parameters constant. Our universe would not be typical. Ergo the
mathematical multiverse does not solve the fine tuning problem.
Manuel Alfonseca
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