Thomas Kuhn |
I continue my comments on Man Ho Chan’s article, which reviews and refutes recent attempts to make multiverse theories scientific. In this post I’ll refer to those attempts that try to modify the current scientific paradigm to include the theories of the multiverse, so that they can be considered scientific. To do this, epistemological changes or scientific paradigm changes should be made.
According to Thomas Kuhn, there are five
criteria that make it possible to evaluate the paradigmatic character of a
theory:
- Accuracy: Indicates whether the predictions
of the theory agree with experimental data discovered after the theory is
formulated. This criterion is similar to falsifiability in the
Popper-style theory, and corresponds to what I have called in another
post validation of the theory. It is clear that
multiverse theories do not meet this criterion, since they do not make testable
predictions.
- Consistency: Indicates whether the theory
agrees with the experimental data we already have. This corresponds to
what I called, in the aforementioned post, model adjustment.
It is argued that multiverse theories are consistent with the data we have
about fine tuning of the laws of the universe to make our existence
possible. Man Ho Chan says that this is true, but that the level of
adjustment achieved is very low. He points out two examples that prove it:
the first, based
on my experiments with Francisco José Soler Gil, which discover that the physical laws of our universe
should show a certain time dependence if we follow the most general type
of multiverse theories. This time dependence does not
happen in our universe. The other is called Q-catastrophe, and was pointed
out in 2005 by Garriga and
Vilenkin. By analyzing the probability distributions of two anthropic
variables (the cosmological constant and parameter Q, which measures primordial
density fluctuations) they conclude that the measured value for Q is not
the most probable. Therefore, if our universe is representative of those universes
compatible with life in the multiverse, the value of Q should be different.
Man Ho Chan also points out some examples of internal inconsistency in
multiverse theories, but I won’t address this issue here.
- Broadness of scope: This
criterion requires that the theory in question be easy to extend to
broader situations. In the case of the multiverse, this is impossible, for
the various theories are incompatible with each other, and we do not even
know the answer to fundamental questions: what is the origin of the
multiverse, the number of universes, and whether or not the fundamental
constants are different in various universes.
- Simplicity: It is argued that multiverse
theories provide a simple way to solve the fine-tuning problem. However,
although we know that the number of universes required to solve this
problem is huge, we do not even know its lower limit. The number usually
proposed (10500) could still be too small. Furthermore,
although the idea of the multiverse is simple, each of the multiverse
theories is far from being simple.
- Fruitfulness: The theory in question should
lead to new research results. But the theories of the multiverse, together
with string theory and chaotic inflation, on which some of them are based,
haven’t been able to propose a single experiment that lets them be
confirmed, so they must be considered infertile, not validated, and
impossible to validate, at least for the time being.
Francisco José Soler Gil |
The conclusion that Man Ho Chan draws from
this analysis is that multiverse theories do not meet any of the criteria
specified by Kuhn to justify a scientific paradigm shift.
Is this the end of the analysis? Well no.
There are those who are so desperate for multiverse theories to be scientific,
that they have proposed even more drastic changes. I’ll talk about it in my next
post.
Thematic Thread on Multiverse and Fine Tuning: Previous Next
Manuel Alfonseca
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