A few weeks ago I had in another
blog a debate that confronted me with three militant atheists who stood for materialist monism, which holds, among other
things, that we are determined by our neurons, that consciousness is an
irrelevant epiphenomenon and that free will is an illusion. In another
post in this blog I have touched on that topic, mentioning the four
philosophical theories that try to explain the conscience, one of which is
materialist monism.
This is the argument I offered to defend
dualism against materialistic monism:
Let’s tackle the problem of human intentionality. When I say: I'm
going to lend money to the bank, so I’ll be paid interest, I’m saying
that the reason why I’ll lend money to the bank is to get interest. This is the
kind of cause that Aristotle called a final cause,
because it is the goal toward which my action is directed, something that is located
in the future. On the other hand, materialist monism says that the only cause
of our actions is in the electric discharges of our neurons. This is what
Aristotle called an efficient cause. Therefore, to
explain the same phenomenon (my lending money to the bank), we are suggested two
different causes: my intention and the sparks in my neurons, this second located
in the present, the first in the future. Is this possible?
