The brain and consciousness

Canadian psychologist Barry Beyerstein published an article with the same title as this post, and an additional subheading that indicates that he is opposing extrasensory perception (ESP), telekinesis (TK) and other supposedly paranormal phenomena. However, he takes the opportunity to attack the existence of the human soul and the existence of God (although he never names God), and launchs a confession of faith in the identity of mind and brain (Psychoneural Identity, PNI); i.e., the monist theory, although he does not say whether he prefers the reductionist or the emergentist version of monism. In support of this, he offers the following arguments:

1. Phylogenetic: there is a phylogenetic relationship between brain complexity and cognitive attributes. Over time, both grew in parallel.
2. Developmental: As the brain matures, its capacity increases.
3. Clinical: Damage to the brain causes loss of brain function.
4. Experimental: It is possible to stimulate parts of the brain and replicate mental phenomena.
5. Experiential: Some substances (nicotine, alcohol, caffeine, LSD, cocaine, and marijuana) affect brain function and cause mental effects.

Beyerstein quotes Donald Hebb, whom he considers the originator of the PNI theory, who wrote this in 1949 in support of his theory:

One cannot logically be a determinist in physics and biology, and a mystic in psychology.

As usual, supporters of monism (especially reductionist monism) seem to have studied using 19th century manuals. Haven’t they heard that in the 20th century physics abandoned determinism after the discovery of quantum mechanics? The reference to biology is even worse: the theory of evolution, which is based on a mixture of chance and necessity, is anything but deterministic. In addition, the use of the word mystic derogatorily to refer to those who do not accept this theory is a clear case of the fallacy of appeal to emotion.

Let us look at a technological example, where we have all the data, and compare it to the mind-brain problem. Let’s consider a television set.

1. It is evident that there is a phylogenetic relationship between the complexity of the circuits and the capacity of the TV set. Older televisions were only capable of showing images in black and white; then we had color TV; later they could show videos; then cathode ray tubes were replaced by plasma or LED screens; teletext was introduced; the number of channels increased by expanding the range of frequencies that the device is capable of understanding and by adding digital to analogic transmission; high resolution was introduced; the possibility of connecting to the Internet; and so on.
2. Before a television works perfectly, its components must be trimmed so that each works optimally and they are correctly adjusted. The tuning process, sometimes quite fine, is necessary for the television to work perfectly. This process parallels the maturation of the brain during the development of the individual.
3. If there is damage to the TV circuitry, it will be harmful for its capabilities: the TV set may stop working entirely or lose one or more functions.
4. It is possible to directly stimulate some parts of the TV set and replicate some of its functions. For instance, if we introduce the information contained in a flash drive at a certain point on the TV set, we can watch on the screen a movie recorded on the flash drive.
5. I’m not aware of anyone introducing chemicals in a TV set to see what happens, but I wouldn’t be surprised, if this was done, that some functions would be affected, and weird things would happen on the screen.

I believe the parallel is faithful to the point that we should assert, following the monist theory, that everything appearing on the screen is generated within the device; that we don’t need to assume that there are external or independent phenomena to explain its behavior; that TV stations do not exist.

Why don’t we believe this? Because we have additional information, we know that TV stations do exist, we can visit them. But then it cannot be argued, as Beyerstein does, that the five above mentioned properties prove, or at least give inklings, in favor of monistic PNI theories, for there is at least one parallel case where we know that this deduction is false.

One of the usual tricks used by atheists to discredit the existence of God and religion is to mix unrelated issues in what they say. Beyerstein does this too. In his article, he mixes extrasensory perception and other dubious paranormal phenomena with the apparition of Christ to Saint Paul, the voices heard by Joan of Arc, or claims by Plato, Newton, and Mozart about having received external inspiration to compose their works. Thus, if the paranormal can be discredited, they hope that religion will also be discredited. And it is possible that this ruse will work, for some readers of that article may not have sufficient criteria to distinguish what should be distinguished.

The same post in Spanish

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Manuel Alfonseca