In another
post in this blog I have described the four theories used by philosophers to
try and solve the problem of human mind: What is intelligence? What is
consciousness? What is free will? Are we actually free, or are we determined, just like meat
machines?
At the end of last
year, Javier PĂ©rez Castells published a book where he addresses some of these
issues from a scientific and philosophical point of view. Its title (in
Spanish) is the same as the title of this post. In particular, chapter 8 of the
book describes some of the models with which various scientists and
philosophers have tried to explain how we make decisions more complex than
those studied by the experiments performed by Libet, Fried and Haynes, which don’t
go much further that pressing a button or raising a hand. These models are
called two-stage,
because they try to explain our decisions assuming that they are made in two
phases: the first, more or less random, in which the brain generates the
available alternatives, followed by a second phase, when we actually make a decision,
after weighing those alternatives.
Two-stage models date
back from the late nineteenth century. The first one was proposed by the
American philosopher William James in 1884. In 1906, the French mathematician
Henri Poincaré proposed another. Soon after, quantum mechanics and its intrinsically
random interpretations introduced possible mechanisms that could act during the
first phase of the process. In the last decades, several of these models have
been developed. Let us look at a few.
- John
Carew Eccles, an Australian neurophysiologist who in 1963 won the Nobel
Prize in Physiology and Medicine for his work on synapses, takes a clearly dualistic position
and thinks that certain brain neurons are subject to the influence of a
spiritual principle that controls their joint activation.
- David
Hodgson, Australian philosopher and judge, uses non-local quantum
indeterminacy in the first phase of his two-stage model, but for the
second phase he resorts to another causal source (the conscious mind) that would choose among the available
alternatives without being determined by the preceding states.
- Daniel
Dennett, American philosopher, takes a compatibilist determinist stance
that redefines freedom
and takes away most of the meaning of this term. In his model, proposed to
explain complex decisions, in the first stage a set of alternatives is
generated unconsciously and a few are selected, among which the agent will
take his final decision “freely.”
- Peter
Tse, American neuroscientist, argues that our current decisions are
influenced by previous ones, for the brain modifies the weights of
synaptic connections. His model (criterial
causality) is an intermediate between determinism and pure indeterminism,
but like Dennett’s it does not seem to leave much room for true freedom.
- Brigitte
Falkenburg, German philosopher, proposes a dualistic model like Eccles,
based on the increase in entropy
inherent to irreversible processes.
- John
Searle, the American philosopher who proposed the mental experiment of the Chinese room
against the
Turing test, is working on a two-stage model of consciousness and free
will, in which the path from the neurobiological level to the conscious
level is not continuous, but contains gaps where a free decision-making
capacity can take place. According to Searle, if free will were not real,
there are no evolutionary reasons why so many resources, energy and effort
would be used to simulate it.
John Searle |
The same post in Spanish
Thematic thread on Natural and Artificial Intelligence: Preceding Next
Manuel Alfonseca
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