Mind and Cosmos

Thomas Nagel

Thomas Nagel, philosopher, professor at New York University and specialized in the philosophy of mind, has published a book (Mind and Cosmos) where he summarizes his argumentation against materialist reductionism, dominant in philosophy since the mid-nineteenth century. I have read the book in a Spanish translation made by the Seville professor Francisco Rodríguez Valls, with whom I have collaborated more than once.

The book provides strong arguments in support of the claim that materialistic reductionism cannot explain conscience, reason, and other mental elements without explaining them away. But since conscience and reason are the dominant elements of our worldview, the conclusion we should arrive at is that materialistic reductionism must be false.

C.S. Lewis

Let's look at one of his arguments: it is clear that the theory of evolution, like any other scientific theory, is a consequence of human reason. Therefore, explaining reason as a consequence of the action of evolution (which is nothing more than applying to man the theory of evolution) is to incur the fallacy of circular reasoning (begging the question). If A explains B, B cannot explain A. This argument does not differ much from the one proposed by C.S. Lewis in chapter 2 of his book Miracles, which was later developed by Victor Reppert and Alvin Plantinga. In this book Nagel does not quote Lewis or Reppert, although he does quote Plantinga.

Pierre Teilhard de Chardin

Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (whom Nagel does not mention either) offered an alternative to materialistic reductionism in his first book published after his death, The Phenomenon of Man (see my blog post), where he asserted that the mind is a fundamental component of the universe together with matter, and every material being has some mental element, albeit vestigial. This theory is similar to what Nagel calls reductive constitutive explanation in his book.

After rejecting materialist reductionism, Nagel wonders about alternatives. It seems clear that we should recover Aristotle's final causes, banished by modern science since the seventeenth century, as only efficient causes are accepted. However, final causes do exist, and greatly influence our lives. Whenever we design something, we are applying final causes, although at the same time we can also apply efficient causes: when we turn this piece of wood in the lathe in such a way (efficient cause), so that it will take such a shape (final cause). As Nagel correctly points out, a science or philosophy that ignores final causes must be incomplete.

Nagel mentions theism as an alternative to materialistic reductionism. If the world has been created by God, it must include final causes in its composition, for its existence would be the result of divine intention. But although he accepts that this philosophical position solves the problem, he rejects it. He just provides two “arguments”:

1. Theism will never let us achieve a complete explanation of the cosmos, as God will always remain outside the scope of our explanations. This argument is purely aesthetic, with no philosophical force, for there is no reason why it must be possible to achieve a complete explanation of everything that exists. The problem, by the way, as Nagel points out, also affects materialist reductionism, for our conscience and reason are out of its reach, and even some purely material questions can never be explained, as I indicated in this blog post.
2. Nagel excludes theism as a solution, because he is an atheist and does not want God to exist. He says it quite clearly, not in this book, but in another, The Last Word, where he wrote this: I want atheism to be true and am made uneasy by the fact that some of the most intelligent and well-informed people I know are religious believers. It isn’t just that I don’t believe in God and, naturally, hope that I am right in my belief. It’s that I hope that there is no God! I don't want there to be a God; I don't want the universe to be like that.

What alternative does Nagel offer to get out of this dilemma, if reason leads him to consider materialistic reductionism false, and his atheistic mentality forbids him to accept the theistic solution? Nagel proposes that the solution could be a new philosophical theory where the universe would be teleological (i.e. final causes would be important) but not intentional (it would not be the result of anybody's conscious design). The problem is, he has no idea how such a theory could be built, and leaves its development for the future.

The same post in Spanish
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Manuel Alfonseca